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EDUCATION FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT: THE
SECULAR HUMANISM BAN AND EQUAL ACCESS ACT
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education reported
that the quality of American education, especially in mathematics and
science, had declined during the past twenty years.' Recognizing the detri-
mental effect of an inferior educational system on the American economy,
security, and quality of life,2 Congress enacted the Education for Economic
Security Act (EESA)3 in 1984 to improve scientific education. 4 The first six
titles of the EESA authorize federal funding to improve education through
various programs including training and awards for teachers, merit scholar-
ships, a variety of innovative projects, and the elimination of asbestos hazards
in school buildings.' The last two titles of the EESA, however, do not address
the Act's stated purpose of improving the quality of science and mathematics
instruction.6 Rather, Titles VII and VIII address the social problems of racial
I. See S. REP. No. 151, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, (Report of National Commission on
Excellence in Education entitled "A Nation at Risk, The Imperative for Educational Reform"
described deterioration of American education), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2306, 2307.
2. S. Ra. No 151, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2306. According to the report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
the crisis in education includes shortages of math, science, computer, and foreign language
teachers, skilled technicians, and well-trained scientific personnel. Id. at 2307. The decline in
the quality of mathematics and science education threatens the ability of Americans to perform
the work necessary to sustain the technological revolution. Id. at 2306-08.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4074 (1985) (Education for Economic Security Act).
4. See 130 CONG. REC. S6675 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Stafford)
(referring to need to improve mathematics and science instruction).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3911-4037 (1985) (EESA). Title I of the EESA authorizes the National
Science Foundation to award grants to the following organizations and individuals: state and
local educational agencies and institutions of higher education for the joint establishment of
teacher institutes; institutions of higher education or local educational agencies for implemen-
tation of teacher training and for development of instructional material and programs; individ-
uals who plan to teach math, science, or engineering and who need scholarship aid. Id. at §§
3911-3954. Title II authorizes the Department of Education to provide financial assistance to
state and local educational agencies and to institutions of higher education to improve teaching
skills and instruction in math, science, computer learning, and foreign languages. Id. at §§
3961-3973. Title III authorizes National Science Foundation grants to institutions of higher
learning and permits local educational agencies to pay 50% of the cost of educational partnership
programs between the business and educational communities. Id. at §§ 3981-3988. Title IV
authorizes the President to make annual awards for excellence in teaching to elementary and
secondary school teachers. Id. at §§ 4001-4003. Title V provides federal assistance to states and
local educational agencies for the identification and abatement of asbestos hazards in schools.
Id. at §§ 4011-4021. Title VI provides grants to schools to implement innovative programs
designed to improve student achievement, competence, motivation, and attendance and to
provide incentives and professional development for teachers. Id. at §§ 4031-4037.
6. Id. at § 3901. See infra notes 7-14, 116-22, 142-49, 174-81 and accompanying text
(discussing purposes of Titles VII and VIII of EESA).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:265
integration7 and control of controversial extracurricular student activities, in
public schools.
Title VII of the EESA authorizes funding for magnet schools9 and
prohibits the use of magnet school funds for teaching secular humanism.' 0
The purpose of magnet schools is to achieve voluntary racial desegregation
by providing a superior curriculum in particular subject areas such as science
and music." The specialized curriculum acts as a magnet, attracting students
who otherwise would attend more segregated neighborhood schools. While
Title VII promotes desegregation to improve the quality of education,'2 the
secular humanism ban in Title VII does not appear to be aimed at improving
education. Title VIII, moreover, applies entirely to student activities outside
the classroom.' 3 Title VIII provides that public secondary schools which
receive federal assistance, and which allow noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises, may not refuse equal access to any
student groups based on the content of speech during meetings of these
student groups.'
4
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 4053 (purpose of Title VII of EESA is to provide financial assistance
to local educational agencies for operation of magnet schools to eliminate minority group
segregation and discrimination); infra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text (discussing of purpose
of magnet schools).
8. See U.S.C. § 4071 (Equal Access Act applies to noncurriculum-related student group
meetings); infra notes 13, 14, 142-49, 179-84 and accompanying text (discussion of provisions
of Equal Access Act).
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4062 (1985).
10. Id. at § 4059 (1985) (EESA).
11. See 20 U.S.C. § 4055 (magnet school offers special curriculum attracting substantial
numbers of students of different races). In 1972 Congress passed the Emergency School Aid
Act (ESAA), which authorized federal funding for school desegregation programs including
magnet schools. 130 CONG. REc. S6680 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
In 1981, Congress repealed ESAA after including desegregation programs in block grants to
states. Id. Block grants represented a congressional effort to reduce the paperwork, regulation,
and cost involved in the administration of specialized programs by providing federal payments
to state governments for more generally specified purposes. Donnelly, Block Grants: An Old
Republican Idea, 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 449 (1981). Block grants allow state or local officials
to decide how to allocate funds for specific programs within a general area. Id. Because the
spending provisions of block grants were not as specific as ESAA provisions, many states
reduced funding allocations for desegregation programs. 130 CONG. Rac. S6680 (daily ed. June
6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). Funding for ESAA programs dropped from $149.2
million in 1981 to $25.2 million in 1982. Id. One of the stated purposes of Title VII of the
EESA was to restore funding for school desegregation. Id.
12. See 130 CONG. REC. S6676 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Eagleton)
(magnet school funding will help to ensure equal opportunity for quality education); id at S6681
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (magnet school program is designed to promote academic excellence
for students of all races). See also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954)
(segregated schools provide inferior educational opportunities for minority students).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1985) (EESA) (equal access provision only applies to meetings
of student groups during noninstructional time).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1985) (EESA); see infra notes 142-49, 181 and accompanying text
(discussion of purpose of Equal Access Act).
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In addition to failing to address the goals of the EESA, Titles VII and
VIII are controversial because of their first amendment implications. Title
VIII, the Equal Access Act, originated as an attempt to counteract federal
court decisions that had prohibited student-initiated, religious group meetings
on school premises because the courts viewed these meetings as a violation
of the Establishment Clause." Title VIII counteracts the courts' interpretation
by construing the first amendment's free speech guarantee to protect student
religious groups from discrimination by school authorities.' 6 The controversy
over Title VII stems from the Title's ban on using magnet school funds to
teach secular humanism. Commentators have suggested that opponents of
secular humanism regard the ban as a justification for censoring ideas that
conflict with the tenets of some religious groups. 7 Both the secular humanism
15. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-11, (review and discussion of federal court
decisions regarding access of student religious groups to public schools), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2348, 2351-57. The Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony in-
dicating that many school administrators are confused by recent decisions of federal courts. Id.
at 2357. These administrators believe that the Establishment Clause prohibits students from engaging
in religious speech on school premises. Id. at 2352. See infra notes 142-49, 178-81 and accompany-
ing text (discussing protection of student's rights as purpose of Equal Access Act). The original
equal access bill, sponsored by Senator Denton, protected only religious activities, applied to
both elementary and secondary schools, concerned extracurricular activities before, during and
after school hours, and provided for a private right of action. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2348. As enacted, Title VIII differs from Senator Denton's original bill in that it concerns
religious, political, philosophical and other activities, applies only to secondary schools, governs
only extracurricular activities before and after school hours, and has no specific enforcement
provisions. Id.
The term Establishment Clause refers to the following portion of the first amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
In 1940, the United States Supreme Court held that the religion clauses of the first amendment
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
Courts have regarded religious meetings on school premises as an unconstitutional endorse-
ment of religion by school authorities. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 741
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liber-
ties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Education, 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1123 (1981). See infra notes 148, 161-66, and accompanying text (discussion of cases
in which courts banned or permitted schools to ban religious meetings of student groups).
16. See S. REP. No.357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24, (discussion in Senate Judiciary
Committee's Report concerning legal basis for viewing student religious meetings as protected
speech), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2348, 2367-70; Widmar v. Vincent
454 U.S. 263 (1981). According to the Senate Committee, the Widmar case held that the Free
Speech Clause protects student religious speech from infringement by school authorities unless
the school shows that student speech of this type substantially interferes with school discipline
or invades the rights of others. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2348, 2370.
17. See Remes, Equal Access Act, 'Humanism' Ban Extend an Invitation to Litigation,
Nat'l L.J., June 24, 1985, at 17, col. 2. Remes contends that the aim of the secular humanism
ban is to enable fundamentalists to compel local school boards to eliminate from the curriculum
ideas that fundamentalists deem unacceptable. Id. Remes also maintains that fundamentalists
think that teaching autonomy and free thought undermines family and religious authority. Id.
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ban and the Equal Access Act may invite litigation concerning the contro-
versial issue of the role of religion in the public schools. 8
In enacting Title VII, Congress did not define secular humanism.' 9
Instead, Congress delegated the authority to administer Title VII to the
Department of Education ° which, in turn, delegated the responsibility for
defining secular humanism to local school districts. 2' Since fundamentalist
groups probably will use the secular humanism ban in Title VII to challenge
magnet school curriculums,22 the meaning of the term secular humanism will
become important to lawyers and courts if these challenges result in lawsuits.
Webster's Dictionary defines humanism as a Renaissance philosophy that
affirms man's dignity, worth, and capacity for self-realization through reason
and that often repudiates supernaturalism.2 3 Those who profess to be hu-
manists acknowledge many different kinds of humanism, 24 but humanism's
18. Id. at 16, col. 1, 18, col. 2.
19. 130 CONG. R~c. H7742 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Perkins). Several
months after passage of the EESA, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, one of the sponsors of
the Magnet School Amendment, said, "I have no idea what secular humanism is. No one
knows." Rosenbaum, Of 'Secular Humanism' and Its Slide into Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1985, at 16, col. 5.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 4054 (1985).
21. 34 C.F.R. § 280.40(d) (1985). In support of its decision to delegate the responsibility
for determining what constitutes secular humanism to local school boards, the Department of
Education referred to the legislative history of the EESA. 50 Fed. Reg. 21, 197 (1985). During
the Senate debate on the magnet school provision, no senators questioned or explained the
secular humanism ban. 130 CoNG. REc. S6675-82 (daily ed. June 6, 1984). In the House of
Representatives, discussion of the term secular humanism was brief. 130 CONG. REC. H7742
(daily ed. July 25, 1984). Asserting that education is a local concern, Representative Perkins
explained that only teachers and local boards should decide whether any subject matter, including
evolution, is secular humanism. Id.
22. See Mackay-Smith, Schools Are Becoming the Battleground in the Fight Against
Secular Humanism, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1985, at 31, col. 3. One conservative group, Concerned
Women for America, which provides legal services for parents suing school districts that
allegedly advocate secular humanism, predicted that in 1986 parents will challenge up to 3000
school districts for teaching secular humanism. Id. at col. 4. Concerned Women for America
claims a membership of 500,000, which exceeds the combined memberships of the National
Organization for Women, the League of Women Voters, and the National Women's Political
Caucus. Ostling, Jerry Falwell's Crusade, TIME, Sept. 2, 1985, at 48, 57. The leader of Concerned
Women for America is Beverly LaHaye, whose husband, Tim LaHaye, is a fundamentalist
Baptist minister, political lobbyist, and founder of the American Coalition for Traditional
Values. Id. at 51, 57. Tim LaHaye contends that humanists are not qualified to hold government
positions. Id. at 52.
Fundamentalists comprise the right wing of the evangelical movement, which is larger and
more moderate than the fundamentalist movement. Id. at 49-50. The primary characteristics of
fundamentalism are a belief in the inerrancy and historical accuracy of the Bible and a militant
resistance to any idea that conflicts with the fundamentalist interpretation of Biblical teachings.
Id. at 49.
Although the secular humanism ban in the EESA applies only to magnet schools, many
opponents of secular humanism view the ban as supportive of their position against secular
humanism in all public schools. Mackay-Smith, supra at 31, col. 3.
23. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 556 (1975).
24. Kurtz, Preface to THE HUMANIsT ALTERNATIVE: SOME DEFINITIONS OF HUMANISM 6
(P. Kurtz ed. 1973).
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central tenets include a belief in the theory of evolution 2l and a rejection of
absolute values perceived through divine revelation. 26 Humanists espouse an
ethical system valuing free thought,27 the scientific method, democracy, and
freedom. 28 Humanists also believe that human beings have an obligation to
develop international solutions to the worldwide problems of security, con-
servation, population control, technological development and direction, and
education. 29 Humanism has links to many other philosophies including
communism, pragmatism, personalism or spiritualism, and existentialism.30
Secular humanism, as distinguished from humanism, has not been de-
fined clearly. However, when applied to humanism the term secular appar-
ently denotes an absence of religion or theism.3 ' Since most humanists do
not subscribe to a belief in the traditional idea of God,32 the term secular
humanism seems redundant. Whether secular humanism differs from hu-
manism is unclear except that fundamentalist Christians apparently use the
term secular humanism to connote an affirmative opposition or hostility to
Christian beliefs.
33
25. See deFord, Heretical Humanism, in THE HUMANIST ALTERNATIVE, supra, note 24, at
81 (humanism is based on concept of evolution). See also Whitehead and Conlan, The
Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1, 29 & 42 (evolution is cornerstone of secular humanism).
26. See deFord, Heretical Humanism, in THE HUMANIST ALTERNATIVE, supra note 24, at
87 (ethics is product of human experience); Zimmerman, Aren't Humanists Really Atheists?,
id. at 84 (absence of absolute values is major trait of humanism); Lamont, Naturalistic
Humanism, id. at 129 (naturalistic humanism rejects supernaturalism and metaphysical idealism);
Whitehead and Conlan, supra note 25, at 30 (humanism is secular because it denies tenets of
theism).
27. See Kurtz, epliloque to THE HUMANIST ALTERNATIVE, supra note 24, at 182 (free
thought is essential characteristic of humanism).
28. See Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 84 (democracy, freedom, and scientific method
are humanistic values); Lamont, supra note 26, at 129 (man's supreme ethical aim is working
for human welfare using methods of reason, science, and democracy).
29. Blackham, A Definition of Humanism, in THE HUMANIsT ALTERNATVE, supra note
24, at 36. Humanists believe that the proper goal of education is to promote autonomy and an
open society. Id.
30. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1967). Communism is humanistic in its goal of
abolishing man's self-alienation which Communists see as the product of private property and
capitalistic society. Id. The pragmatic concept that man is the measure of everything is
humanistic. Id. Personalism or spiritualism is a humanistic philosophy because it affirms man's
capacity to relate to the eternal or transcendent. Id. Existentialism's emphasis on the human
subjective universe is humanistic. Id.
31. See P. Kurtz, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMANISM at vii (1983) (Secular humanism
holds that people can live ethical lives and make significant contributions to social justice and
human welfare without believing in theistic religion); J.P. VON PRAAG, FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMANISM 34 (1982) (Secular humanism is geared toward earthly happiness and fulfillment of
human potential); J. HITCHCOCK, WHAT IS SECU1.AR HUMANISM? 10-12 (1982) (Secular humanism
rejects absolute moral values and practical effect of belief in God).
32. See generally THE HUMANIST ALTERNATIVE: SOME DEnmIoNs OF HUMANISM (P. Kurtz
ed. 1973). See also EHRENFIELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 5 (1978) (humanism rejects
mythologies of power including God); McKown, What is Secular Humanism? A Religion, a
World View or a Philosophy?, Birmingham News, July 21, 1985 at E3, col. I (secular humanists
disbelieve in supernatural).
33. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1535, n.4 (9th Cir.) cert.
19861
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Detractors describe secular humanism as an atheistic, anti-Christian3 4
philosophy that advocates the redistribution of wealth, control of the envi-
ronment, disarmament, creation of a world-wide socialist government, and
the destruction of American patriotism and the free enterprise system."
Critics of secular humanism claim that this philosophy has permeated the
public educational system3 6 through a variety of programs including sex
education, 7 Effective Parenting Information for Children (EPIC),3" and
values clarification.3 9 These types of programs, according to opponents of
denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985). The plaintiff in Grove, a fundamentalist Christian seeking removal
of a book from a high school curriculum, asserted that secular humanism is "a religion
dedicated to affirmatively opposing or showing hostility toward Christianity." Id. See also
Whitehead and Conlan, supra note 25, at 31 (secular humanism actively rejects, and seeks to
eliminate, theism).
34. See Department Proposes Rule to Curb Teaching of 'Secular Humanism', Washington
Post, Jan. 10, 1985, at A19, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Department Proposes Rule]. An aide
to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, the senator who insisted on including the secular humanism ban in
Title VII of the EESA, described secular humanism as an "atheistic philosophy." Id.
35. Department Proposes Rule, Washington Post, supra note 34 at A19, col. 4.
36. See Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic
Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196, 1205-11 (1982). Many educators have endorsed humanistic
education as a method for schools to meet the need for moral instruction while avoiding the
political and legal pitfalls of more traditional forms of moral education. Id. at 1205. Instead
of teaching a predetermined set of values, humanistic education teaches a methodology for
resolving moral problems. Id. at 1205. Some programs, such as values clarification, emphasize
the cognitive development of children while others, such as sensitivity training or role playing,
stress emotional development. Id. at 1205-06. Humanistic education conflicts with many religious
dogmas with respect to basic assumptions about the innate nature of man, the spiritual aspect
of human beings, and the existence of an external standard of morality. Id. at 1208-09.
37. See HITCHCOCK, WHAT IS SEcutA HUMANISM? 106-08 (1982). Many Christian parents
believe that compulsory sex education courses in the public schools expose their children to
secular humanist ideas. Id. at 106. These parents contend that these courses undermine religious
beliefs by imparting information without moral guidance. Id. at 107. Some parents also object
to sex education either because some of the leading authorities in the field and heads of
organizations, such as Planned Parenthood, have humanist connections or because parents feel
that the sex experts implicitly promote extramarital sex. Id. at 107-08.
38. See TIME, supra note 23, at 55; Mackay-Smith, supra note 23, at 31, col. 5. Effective
Parenting for Children (EPIC) is a three-part program for parents, teachers, and children and
is designed to teach children self-awareness, responsible behavior, and decision-making in order
to prevent problems like alcoholism, child abuse, and teenage pregnancy. TIME, supra note 22,
at 55; Mackay-Smith, supra note 22, at 31, col. 5. Although President Reagan has praised
EPIC, conservative critics maintain that EPIC negates absolute values and therefore is consistent
with secular humanism. TIME, supra note 22, at 55; Mackay-Smith, supra note 22, at 31, col.
5.
39. See Department Proposes Rule, supra note 34, at A19, col. 5. According to Ed
Darrell, aid to Senator Hatch and a press spokesman for the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee, secular humanism "is a almost a term of art. You get into value
education and a bunch of touchy-feely stuff that came out in the 70's. Conservatives object
because these things may get in the way of a Christian education." Id. Values clarification
focuses on the process of valuing. Note, supra note 36 at 1205 n.48. Theorists in values
education assume that no particular abstract value system is correct for every individual and
maintain that real valuing occurs only when one freely chooses, publicly affirms, and consistently
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secular humanism, deny absolute moral values and convey a belief in sexual
permissiveness, abortion, suicide, and socialism. 4°
While controversy exists concerning the religious nature of secular hu-
manism, in Torcaso v. Watkins,4' the United States Supreme Court included
the term secular humanism in a partial list of nontheistic religions42 to
illustrate that the first amendment protects nontheistic beliefs as religions.
4 3
The Torcaso decision held that a Maryland law requiring all public office
holders to declare a belief in God was unconstitutional because the law
invaded an individual's freedom to disbelieve in God." Thus, by including
secular humanism in a list of religions, the Supreme Court in Torcaso implied
that secular humanism is a religion.
45
Some lower federal courts, however, have interpreted Torcaso to mean
that a philosophy is not a religion unless it lays claim to ultimate truth and
is supported by a formal group. 46 In Malnak v. Yogi, 47 for example, the
acts upon a value. Id. Values clarification exercises stimulate student discussion of the ramifi-
cations of various solutions to hypothetical moral dilemmas. Id. at 1206-07. Some critics believe
that encouraging children to examine and question values undermines parental and religious
authority and encourages children to regard all values as relative instead of absolute. J.
HrrCHCOCK, WHAT IS SECULAR HUMANISM? supra note 37, at 106. See also supra note 38
(conflict between humanistic education and religion).
40. Mackay-Smith, supra note 22, at 31, col. 3.
41. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
42. Id. at 495 n. 11. In addition to secular humanism, the Torcaso opinion listed Buddhism,
Taoism, and Ethical Culture as examples of religions that omit a belief in God from their
teachings.. Id. The Supreme Court cited two lower court decisions holding that nontheistic
philosophies were religions for tax exemption purposes. Id.; see Washington Ethical Soc'y v.
District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (held, Ethical Society qualified for
tax exemption under statute granting exemption for buildings used primarily for "public religious
worship" because worship means performing religious services, not necessarily paying homage
to supernatural); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315
P.2d 394, 409 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (with respect to tax exemption for property used solely
for religious purposes, question is whether activities of humanistic group are analogous to
activities of theistic churches). In Washington Ethical Society, the court limited its holding to
the narrow question of whether the Society qualified for the tax exemption, not whether the
Society is a religious society. 249 F.2d at 129.
43. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 (government cannot constitutionally impose requirements
that aid all believers as opposed to nonbelievers or that aid all religions based on belief in God
as opposed to religions with other beliefs).
44. Id. at 496. In Torcaso, the State of Maryland refused to grant Torcaso a commission
to serve as a notary public because Torcaso was unwilling to say that he believed in God. Id.
at 489.
45. See id. at 495 n. 11 (Supreme Court cited secular humanism as example of nontheistic
religion); supra note 42 (discussing Torcaso).
46. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). In
Malnak, Judge Adams interpreted the Torcaso court's reference to secular humanism as alluding
to the philosophy of the plaintiff group seeking tax exemption in Fellowship of Humanity v.
County of Alameda. Id. at 206; see Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.1l; Fellowship of Humanity,
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. App. 1957). According to Judge Adams, the
District of Columbia Circuit and the California District Court of Appeals recognized respectively
the Washington Ethical Society and the Fellowship of Humanity as religious groups for tax
exemption purposes primarily because these groups functioned like churches in holding regular
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Third Circuit held that New Jersey high schools had violated the Establish-
ment Clause by offering a course that effectively advanced a religion and
religious concepts. 48 The concurring opinion in Malnak explained that the
course contained several indicia of a religion including a religious ceremony,
an organized group of supporters, and a comprehensive system of beliefs
addressing ultimate questions such as the meaning of life. 49 The concurrence
asserted that while Torcaso's reference to secular humanism suggested that
an organized group of secular humanists might be a religious organization,
the Torcaso Court did not declare that humanism is a religion.5 0 The Malnak
concurrence noted that a state establishes a religion when the state advances
the teachings of a comprehensive belief system, but not when the state merely
endorses isolated precepts of a religion.
5 '
Other courts have made a similar distinction between government activity
that supports a religion and government activity that merely disseminates
knowledge. 2 In Grove v. Mead School District No. 354,53 for example, the
Sunday services and advancing certain precepts. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 206. See supra note 44
(briefly explaining holdings in Fellowship of Humanity and Washington Ethical Society cases).
See also Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979), aff'd 636 F.2d
206 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981). In Women's Services, the
plaintiff claimed that Nebraska's abortion law violated the Establishment Clause because the
sole purpose of the law was to protect fetal life, a purpose based on the religious belief that
life begins at conception. 483 F. Supp. at 1032. In defining the types of beliefs that qualify as
religions for first amendment purposes, the United States District Court for Nebraska stated
that a nontheistic belief must have tenets and organization. Id. at 1034.
47. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
48. Id. at 197-98. In Malnak v. Yogi, a high school curriculum included a course entitled
Science of Creative Intelligence-Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM), which required each
student to attend a "puja," a ceremony involving religious offerings to deities. Id. The Malnak
court found that the course was religious in nature, based on the content of the textbook, the
participation of students in a religious ceremony, and because teachers of the course were not
regular high school faculty members, but were imported advocates of SCI/TM. Id. at 198-99.
Consequently, the Malnak court held that the primary effect of the SCI/TM course was to
advance religion. Id. at 198. Furthermore, the Malnak court held that the expenditure of public
funds and the use of public school facilities to teach SCI/TM constituted excessive government
entanglement with religion. Id.
49. Id. at 207-09.
50. Id. at 212. The Malnak concurrence noted that the Torcaso Court's reference to the
secular humanist group in Fellowship of Humanity seemed to identify a group that supported
a comprehensive belief system. Id. at 212 n.52. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11
(1961) (referring to secular humanism as example of nontheistic religion); Fellowship of
Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957) (held, humanistic group qualified for religious tax. exemption); supra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text (discussion of meaning of reference to secular humanism in Torcaso v.
Watkins).
51. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 212.
52. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1985)
(eliminating from school curriculum every idea that is objectionable to any religion would
critically impede state's interest in providing well-rounded education) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
85 (1985); Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution, 636 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (government
exhibit on evolution does not violate Establishment Clause just because exhibit coincides with
tenet of secular humanism).
53. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Ninth Circuit held that the Constitution does not require a public school to
exclude a book from the curriculum simply because the book expresses ideas
that are offensive to certain religions. 54 The Grove court determined that the
book in question merely provided a cultural perspective and neither estab-
lished nor opposed religion." The plaintiff in Grove contended that the use
of the book in a high school English curriculum effectively advanced secular
humanism, which the plaintiff, relying chiefly on Torcaso, characterized as
a religion.5 6 The concurring opinion in Grove read the Torcaso Court's
allusion to secular humanism as referring to an organized humanist group
that met on Sundays and promoted a comprehensive belief system.17 The
Grove concurrence explained that assigning an autobiographical novel, which
incidentally presented the religious views of a poor, rural, black adolescent,
did not approach the endorsement of a comprehensive belief system sup-
ported by a formal group. 58 In addition, the Grove concurrence rejected the
plaintiff's implication that secular means antireligious instead of nonreli-
gious. 9
Like the plaintiff in Grove, some opponents of secular humanism wish
to have secular humanism recognized as a religion in order to contest its
inclusion in the public school curriculum as a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against the establishment of religion.6° Whether the courts should
54. Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d at 1534. The plaintiff in Grove
objected to the book The Learning Tree by Gordon Parks, a well-known black photographer.
Id. at 1531. A high school English teacher assigned this autobiographical novel to expose
students to some of the attitudes and expectations of the black American subculture. Id. at
1540. Maintaining that the book advocates anti-Christian values and beliefs, the plaintiff in
Grove claimed that the book's primary effect was to advance the religion of secular humanism
and to inhibit the plaintiff's religion, "Biblical Christianity." Id. at 1539.
55. Id. at 1534.
56. Id. at 1535-36. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961) (including
secular humanism in list of nontheistic religions); supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text
(allegations that secular humanism is anti-Christian).
57. Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1536-37 (9th Cir. 1985). The
Grove concurrence cited the Third Circuit's opinion in Malnak v. Yogi to support the conclusion
that the Torcaso Court was referring to an organized group of secular humanists that received
a religious tax exemption in Fellowship of Humanity. Id. at 1537. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); Fellowship
of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957).
58. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1537.
59. Id. at 1536. The concurrence in Grove rejected the plaintiff's dualistic perspective
which divides the world into either religious or antireligious realms. Id. Failure to recognize the
secular or nonreligious-as distinguished from antireligious-nature of some government activ-
ities renders meaningless the Supreme Court's language in Establishment Clause decisions. Id.
As the Malnak concurrence explained, if "secular" means antireligious, it would make no sense
for the Supreme Court to hold that government activity must have a secular purpose to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause. Id. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (to
avoid violating Establishment Clause statute in question must have secular purpose and effect);
infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of Establishment Clause contro-
versies).
60. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
claimed Smithsonian supported religion of secular humanism by explaining and advocating
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regard secular humanism, or any philosophy, as a religion seems to depend
on the context of the question. Courts sometimes apply different definitions
of religion in deciding establishment questions as opposed to free exercise
issues.6' In free exercise cases, the Supreme Court has adopted a broad
definition of religion to encompass nontheistic belief systems. 62 Some courts
and commentators have suggested, however, that in establishment cases, a
narrower definition may be more appropriate in order to avoid labeling
many benevolent government programs constitutionally suspect.
63
In determining whether a government activity violates the Establishment
Clause, courts must distinguish between activity that endorses or imposes an
entire doctrine and activity that merely advocates some ideas that a belief
system happens to embrace. 64 Government endorsement of a belief system
unconstitutionally advances a religion while government advocacy of discrete
ideas does not.65 The language of Title VII is unclear concerning whether
theory of evolution); Jackson v. State of California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972). In Jackson,
the plaintiff sought to require the state to provide tuition grants for children to attend nonpublic
schools. 460 F.2d at 283. To support his claim, the plaintiff contended that the California
public school system had established the "irreligion of secular humanism." Id. at 283, n.l. See
also supra note 54 (explaining plaintiff's allegation in Grove).
61. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985)
(supporting idea that definition of religion should vary when reviewing Establishment Clause
or Free Exercise Clause). The Grove court indicated that the pervasive nature of modern
government calls for a more restrictive definition of religion in the context of Establishment
Clause analysis. Id. But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (Religion does not have two different meanings for Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause). See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing possible application
of different definitions of religion).
62. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180-184 (1965). In Seeger, the Supreme
Court construed the term religious in the statute governing conscientious objector status to
mean beliefs which occupy the same place in the objector's life as an orthodox belief in God
occupies in the traditionally recognized objector's life. Id. at 184. After reviewing the writings
of several modern theologians, such as Paul Tillich and Bishop John A. T. Robinson, the
Seeger Court concluded that the statute's definition of "Supreme Being" must extend beyond
the traditional idea of God to encompass modern theology's broad spectrum of religious beliefs.
Id. at 180-83.
63. See L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CoNsTrrToNAL LAW 827-31 (1978). Tribe recognizes that
today's increasing diversity of beliefs combined with modern theological concepts make inevi-
table a broadened understanding of religion. Id. at 826-27. Tribe proposes a two-fold definition
of religion whereby the Free Exercise Clause would protect any beliefs or practices that are
arguably religious, but any government action that is arguably nonreligious would not violate
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 828. For example, Tribe suggests that a government program
that encourages an arguably religious activity, without mandating that activity, does not violate
the Establishment Clause. Id. He contends that adopting a broad definition for Establishment
Clause purposes calls into question the constitutionality of many benevolent government
programs that advance arguably religious values, such as human dignity and morality, especially
when these government programs result from political activity by religious groups. Id. at 831.
64. See supra note 51-52 and accompanying text (explaining differences between belief
system and ideas).
65. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (government
support for theory of evolution through Smithsonian exhibit does not establish a religion simply
because exhibit agrees with a tenet of that religion).
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the Act contemplates banning the dissemination of all secular humanist ideas
or merely forbids the teaching of secular humanism as a comprehensive
belief system. 6 Banning the teaching of a comprehensive belief system known
as secular humanism may be an acceptable reminder that schools may not
endorse any religion, theistic or nontheistic. The official suppression of ideas,
however, is constitutionally unacceptable because the first amendment guar-
antees freedom of speech and belief.67
While the Supreme Court has expanded the definition of religion with
respect to the Free Exercise Clause, 6' the Court, since 1947, has construed
the Establishment Clause to prohibit legislation that has the purpose or
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 69 Although the Supreme
Court has held that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality
toward religion, 70 some current members of the Court disagree with that
interpretation. 7' Courts and historians generally agree that the Framers of
66. See 20 U.S.C. § 4059 (1985). Title VII of the EESA states: "Grants under this
subchapter may not be used.. .for the courses of instruction the substance of which is secular
humanism." Id.
67. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982). In Pico, the dissent agreed with the plurality's assertion that the "Constitution does not
permit the official suppression of ideas." Id. at 907. The dissent maintained, however, that
education is necessarily a selective presentation of relevant and appropriate ideas. Id. at 914
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (state's attempt
to prohibit teaching of theory of evolution because theory conflicted with religious-belief violates
first amendment); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (first amendment
"does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom").
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the incompleteness of an education devoid
of religious ideas. See School Dist. of Abingdon v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (education
is incomplete without study of religions and their relationship to civilization); McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (currents of religious
thought are essential aspects of education).
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing different definitions of religion
for two religion clauses).
69. See Abingdon School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (to withstand
strictures of Establishment Clause, statute must have secular legislative purpose and primary
effect that neither enhances nor inhibits religion); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947) (Neither the state nor the federal government "can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions or prefer one religion over another").
70. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (Establishment Clause does not
require government to be hostile toward religion but to be neutral regarding competition between
sects); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 18 (first amendment requires state to be neutral
in relations with believers and nonbelievers).
71. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2504 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Court has exacerbated conflict between accommodation and establishment of religion by
requiring government neutrality toward religion); id. at 2508 (Burger C.J., dissenting) (if
government may not accommodate religious observances, "benevolent neutrality" will translate
into "callous indifference"); id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting) (Court should reassess its
precedents regarding Establishment Clause); id. at 2512-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (history
indicates that first amendment's purpose was to prohibit establishment of national religion-and
to prevent discrimination among sects, not to require neutrality by government in conflicts
between religion and irreligion).
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the Constitution recognized the danger of religious persecution inherent in
the establishment of a national religion and the potential for political strife
when a government shows a preference for a religious sect or particular
belief.7 2 Some judges and commentators believe, however, that the Framers
did not intend to force the government to take a neutral stance toward
religion or to erect a "wall of separation between church and state," but
only intended to prevent the designation of a national church.7
Despite the controversy surrounding the intent of the Framers, for more
than twenty years the Supreme Court consistently has construed the Estab-
lishment Clause to prohibit laws requiring prayer in public schools, main-
taining that the purpose of these laws is to advance religion.7 4 In cases
involving other issues pertaining to religion in schools, however, Supreme
Court opinions have not drawn a bright line between endorsement and
permissible accommodation of religion. For example, in Everson v. Board
of Education5 the Supreme Court held that a state may reimburse parents
for the cost of transporting their children to and from school even though
the children attend parochial schools.7 6 In Lemon v. Kurtzman7 7 however,
72. See Cord, Understanding the First Amendment, NAT'L REV., Jan. 22, 1982 at 26
(Framers of Constitution designed first amendment to prevent establishment of national religion
or giving preferred legal status to one denomination); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2513
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Framers sought to prevent establishment of national church
and preference for one sect); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (at time of adoption of
Constitution many Americans were familiar with dangers inherent in union of church and state).
73. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Framers of Establishment
Clause only intended to prevent federal government from giving preferential treatment to one
religious denomination); L. TRIE, A ~aicr N CONSTIUnrONAL LAW, 878-879 (1978). History
may reveal that the Framers intended the Establishment Clause as a protection for religions
established by the various states. Id. See generally Cord, Understanding the First Amendment,
NAT'L REv., Jan. 22, 1982 at 26-32 (review of history that refutes interpretation of Establishment
Clause as requiring wall of separation between church and state). As Justice O'Connor noted,
however, the Framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated the problems involved in
the relationship between religion and the public schools because free public education was
virtually nonexistent 200 years ago. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2503.
74. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2493 (Alabama statue violated Establishment
Clause because purpose of statute was to convey state approval of prayer); Abingdon School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (laws requiring daily prayer and Bible readings in
schools are unconstitutional because state's purpose was to advance religion); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (law prescribing official prayer for use in public schools constitutes
establishment of religion).
75. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
76. Id. at 18. The Everson Court construed a New Jersey statute, which authorized
reimbursement to parents for the cost of school transportation, as public welfare legislation
designed to help parents transport children safely, regardless of their religion, to and from
accredited schools. Id. The dissenting justices in Everson objected to the local school board's
application of the state statute. Id. at 20, 30 (Jackson, J., and Rutledge, J., dissenting). The
local board's resolution authorized transportation funds only for children attending public or
Catholic schools. Id. Although there was no evidence that reimbursements had been denied to
children attending other nonprofit schools, the dissenting justices contended that the local
board's policy amounted to state support of religion. Id.
77. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the court disapproved statutes that authorized payment of subsidies to
nonpublic schools and teachers even though the statutes provided that state
funds must not be used to teach religion.7 The Lemon Court held that
enforcement of the restrictions on the expenditure of these state subsidies
required a degree of government involvement in parochial school affairs that
amounted to excessive entanglement between church and state.
79
The Supreme Court drew another fine line in addressing the constitu-
tionality of "released time" programs in which schools excused children
from class to receive religious instruction. In McCollom v. Board of Edu-
cation,80 the Court held that released time programs violated the Establish-
ment Clause when the religious classes were held on school premises.8'
However, in Zorach v. Clauson,s2 which involved religious classes off cam-
pus, the Court viewed the released time program as a permissible accom-
modation of religion by the school.8 3 Although the Supreme Court
distinguished Zorach, a permissible accommodation of religion, from Mc-
Collum, an impermissible establishment of religion, because of the factual
similarities between the two cases, these cases provide little real guidance for
meaningful application of the Establishment Clause.
84
In these school cases the Supreme Court endeavored to define the line
between state actions that amount to an establishment of religion and actions
that merely accommodate individuals' right to freely exercise their religious
beliefs. In an effort to provide guidance for lower courts analyzing Establish-
ment Clause issues, the Court in Lemon developed a three-part test for
determining whether a government action constitutes establishment of religion. 85
78. Id. at 625. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon).
79. Id. at 622. See infra note 87 (discussion of Lemon).
80. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
81. See id. at 210. In McCollum v. Board of Education the court held that church and
state are not separate when the state allows religious instruction in public school buildings and
when the state compulsory school attendance law helps to provide pupils for sectarian classes.
Id.
82. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
83. Id. at 315. In Zorach v. Clauson the Court approved a released time program in
which religious classes were held off school premises. Id. However, Justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Jackson wrote separate dissents mainly objecting to the use of the compulsory education
law to aid religious groups and to approve religious beliefs. Id. at 318-25. Cf., McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (held, released time programs are unconstitutional). See
supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing McCollum).
84. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973) (cases arising under religion clauses present perplexing questions because it is impossible
and undesirable to enforce wall of separation); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
("considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what may have
been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to particular
cases but have limited meaning as general principles",); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (wall of separation is "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier").
85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (prescribing three-part test to
determine whether law violates Establishment Clause). The Lemon Court noted that a law could
respect an establishment of religion without actually establishing a religion if the law represents
a step toward the establishment of religion. Id. at 612.
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According to the Lemon test, which courts have applied frequently,6 a statute
does not violate the Establishment Clause when the statute has a secular
purpose, when the statute's primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and when the statute does not foster excessive entanglement between church
and state.87
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that only one of the purposes
of a challenged statute be secular8 In applying the secular purpose prong of
Lemon, the Supreme Court has examined the legislative history and historical
context of the act when the Court has found the purpose of the act obscure. g9
86. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (school prayer statute); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (statute allowing tax deduction for school expenses); Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state grants to nonpublic
schools and tuition grants and tax relief to parents); Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 54, 753
F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.) (school board's refusal to remove objectionable book), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 85 (1985); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), (school board's policy allowing meetings of student religious groups), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(museum exhibit on evolution); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D.
Ark. 1982) (state statute requiring teaching of creation-science).
87. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court
examined Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes authorizing the payment of state funds to
supplement the salaries of nonpublic school teachers who did not teach religion. Id. at 606-07.
The Pennsylvania statute also authorized state reimbursement to nonpublic schools for the cost
of secular books and materials. Id. The Lemon Court recognized that both statutes had the
secular purpose of enhancing the quality of education in all schools subject to compulsory
attendance laws even though the statutes might have had an additional religious purpose. Id. at
613. The Court struck down the statutes because enforcement of the statutes' restrictions
necessarily required a degree of monitoring of religious school teachers, curriculum and records
amounting to excessive entanglement between church and state. Id. Both state statutes required
the state to monitor subsidized parochial school teachers to be sure that the teachers did not
teach religion. Id. at 619-22. The Rhode Island statute also required the state to examine church
school records to determine whether church school per pupil expenditures for secular education
equalled or exceeded per pupil expenditures of public schools. Id. at 620. According to the
Supreme Court, the statutes subsidizing parochial schools created intimate and continuing
relationships between church and state and increased the danger of state control of church
schools. Id. at 622. The Court also noted that because of the large number of parochial schools
in both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, the statutes had the potential to cause political division
along religious lines, a problem the Framers had intended to prevent. Id. The Supreme Court
predicted that people would tend to vote along religious lines on the issues of appropriating
funds to subsidize parochial schools. Id. The Court reasoned that since the Framers of the
Constitution intended to prevent the intrusion of religion into politics and to protect religion
from the power of government, the statutes were unconstitutional. Id. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (primary intent of first amendment
was to keep religious controversy out of public life).
88. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2495 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (if
Alabama school prayer statute had secular purpose in addition to purpose of advancing religion,
statute would be acceptable).
89. See id. at 2490-91 (Supreme Court considered statements of bill's sponsor and Alabama
legislature's previous enactments concerning school prayer to ascertain purpose of challenged
statute); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1968) (Court examined historical accounts
concerning political climate at time Arkansas legislature enacted anti-evolution statute); infra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's method of determining legis-
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In Epperson v. Arkansas,90 for example, the Supreme Court struck down an
Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in public
schools because the legislature's sole purpose in enacting the statute was to
eradicate a theory that conflicted with a religious doctrine.9' To ascertain the
purpose of the Arkansas legislature, the Epperson Court examined the legislative
history of the act in light of historical accounts of the political atmosphere in
Arkansas at the time of the statute's enactment.92 Similarly, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,93 the Supreme Court's most recent school prayer decision, the Court
relied on legislative history to determine the purpose of Alabama's statute
authorizing a minute of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" in public
schools. 94 In Jaffree, after considering statements by the Act's sponsor, the
State's failure to suggest any secular purpose, and the Alabama legislature's
previous attempts to cope with the school prayer issue, the Court concluded
that the Alabama statute lacked a secular purpose. 9s
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a statute having a legitimate
secular purpose may violate the Establishment Clause if the statute's primary
effect is to advance or inhibit religion.96 For example, in Committee for
lative purpose of statutes in Jaffree and Epperson). Several justices have expressed dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court's practice of considering unofficial legislative history in ascertaining a
legislature's purpose in passing a statute. See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (court has no license to psychoanalyze legislators to determine legislative intent);
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., dissenting) (improper for court to invalidate statute on
basis of court's opinion concerning legislature's motives because motives are too difficult to
ascertain).
90. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
91. Id. at 103. The Epperson Court found that the sole purpose of an Arkansas law,
which prohibited teaching evolution in public schools, was to suppress the theory of evolution
because the theory conflicted with a literal interpretation of the Biblical account of the origin
of man. Id. at 108-09.
92. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 108. The Epperson Court noted that the Arkansas legislature
enacted the anti-evolution statute only one year after the Scopes "monkey trial" in Tennessee.
Id. at 109 n.17. The Court speculated that the Scopes trial may have influenced the Arkansas
legislature's choice of language. Id. at 109. In Epperson the Court also referred to advertising
campaigns and letters published in Arkansas newspapers in 1928, which urged public support
for the anti-evolution law as pro-Christian and anti-Communist. Id. at 108 n.16.
93. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
94. See id. at 2481; ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1985 Supp.) (enacted 1981).
95. See Wallace v. Jaffree at 2490-91. In concluding that an Alabama school prayer
statute lacked a secular purpose, the Jaffree Court considered the statements of the Alabama
school prayer bill's sponsor who testified that his sole purpose in sponsoring the bill was "to
return voluntary prayer to the public schools." Id. at 4670. In addition, the State of Alabama
presented no evidence that the statute had any secular purpose. Id. The Court also considered
the succession of school prayer statutes enacted by the Alabama legislature and concluded that
this series of enactments revealed the legislature's intent to convey state approval of prayer in
the public schools. Id. at 4671.
96. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (under Lemon
test, statute must have both secular purpose and primary effect); Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (having secular purpose does not immunize
law that has primary effect of advancing religion).
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Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist" the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether New York statutes unconstitutionally advanced religion in pro-
viding for state grants to nonpublic schools and for tuition grants and tax
relief to low income families whose children attended nonpublic schools." The
Nyquist Court noted that the statutes advanced the secular purpose of increasing
safety, promoting free choice, minimizing taxes, and supporting pluralism. 99
The Court held, however, that this aid, when granted to parochial schools
or to parents of parochial school students, effectively subsidized, and thus
advanced, the religious mission of church schools.' °° The Nyquist Court
distinguished an earlier decision, Board of Education v. Allen,'0 1 in which
the Supreme Court allowed the State of New York to require all local
educational agencies to lend free secular textbooks to all public and private
secondary school students, 0 2 noting that the textbook loans in Allen con-
ferred only an indirect benefit on religious institutions. 13 The distinction
between the effect of the state aid in Nyquist and in Allen appears to rest
on a difference in degree of state control. In Allen, a state agency or local
school responsible for loaning books could purchase only secular books with
state funds.' 4 In Nyquist, however, the State had no mechanism for ensuring
that the state funds provided to parochial schools or parents would not be
used for religious purposes. 03
97. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
98. Id. at 761-69.
99. See id. at 773. The Nyquist court stated that the purpose of state grants to nonpublic
schools for maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment was to ensure the safety,
health, and welfare of students. Id. The purposes of state tuition grants and tax relief to low
income families with children attending nonpublic schools was to give these families the option
of choosing where their children would be educated, to avoid increasing the tax burden of
providing public school education for additional children, and to support the vitality of a
pluralistic society by encouraging the use of private schools. Id. The Nyquist Court concluded
that these secular purposes adequately supported the state statute. Id.
100. See id. at 779 (direct financial aid to parochial schools for maintenance and repair
advances religious mission); id. at 783 (without effective means of ensuring that parents will
use financial aid exclusively for secular purposes, aid to parents effectively provides financial
aid to religious institutions).
101. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
102. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 245 (statute requiring local educational
agencies to lend textbooks free of charge to all secondary school students, including students in
private schools, did not advance religion because loan requirement applied to only secular
books).
103. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771 (law is not constitutionally invalid just because law
confers incidental or indirect benefit upon religious institution). The textbook loans in Allen
benefitted parents who would otherwise have to buy books and thus benefitted religious
institutions only indirectly. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968).
104. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968). See supra note 103 and
accompanying text (effect of loans of secular textbooks).
105. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 791, 798 (1973). See supra note
100 and accompanying text (primary effect of grants to parochial schools and parents is
advancement of religion).
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Ten years after Nyquist, however, the Court held in Mueller v. Allent06
that a Minnesota statute allowing taxpayers to deduct the cost of school
tuition, textbooks, and transportation of dependents did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion.'0 7 The Mueller Court reasoned that the Minne-
sota law made available tax deductions to all parents whereas the tax
deductions and tuition grants in Nyquist were available only to parents of
children in nonpublic schools. 08 The practical effects of the tax relief in
Nyquist and in Mueller are barely distinguishable since parents of public
school children have no tuition costs to deduct and the benefits of deductions
for transportation and textbook costs are likely to be minimal. By definition,
the primary effect test involves a determination of the degree to which a
statute advances or inhibits religion. From a practical standpoint, however,
the Mueller and Nyquist opinions are inconsistent and consequently provide
no clear guidance for application of the effect test.
Under the third prong of the Lemon test, government action may violate
the Establishment Clause if the action fosters excessive entanglement between
church and state even though the government action or law has a secular
purpose and primary effect.' °9 The objective of the entanglement prohibition
is to protect religion from government interference and to prevent religion
from intruding into the domain of government, although complete separation
is impossible."10 Entanglement may occur when a state agency and a religious
institution maintain an intimate administrative relationship, creating the
danger that one will control the other."' Entanglement also occurs when
government action increases the potential for political divisiveness along
religious lines by allowing or encouraging the intrusion of religion into
politics.",2
106. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
107. See id. at 396 (tax deduction for school expenses available to all parents has secular
effect when benefits provided to broad spectrum of groups).
108. Id. at 398.
109. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); supra note 88 and accompanying text
(discussion of Lemon).
110. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623; see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (purpose of religious amendment was "not
only to keep the state's hands out of religion but to keep religion's hands off the state").
111. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22; supra note 87 and accompanying text (state statutes
authorizing subsidies to parochial schools are example of administrative entanglement); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (granting tax exemption to churches involves less
extensive government relationship with churches than taxing churches would require).
112. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623; supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussion of
political division along religious lines). The Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of excessive
entanglement between church and state: government action that creates an intimate relationship
between a government agency and a religious institution and government action that results in
continuing political strife over aid to religion. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). In the past Supreme Court justices have raised the issue of
political divisiveness along religious lines in cases that did not involve direct state subsidies to
religious institutions. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter,
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Thus far, opponents of secular humanism have been unsuccessful in
removing the influence of secular humanism from public schools and insti-
tutions by claiming that secular humanism is a religion."' The secular
humanism ban in Title VII of the EESA may represent the beginning of
legislative attempts to purge humanistic education from school curriculums."
4
One might question the constitutionality of this type of legislative censorship
because banning the teaching of ideas or values that one religious group
opposes may be equivalent to advancing the beliefs of the opposing group.
To ascertain whether the secular humanism ban violates the Establish-
ment Clause, a court would apply the three-pronged Lemon test."' The first
prong requires finding a secular purpose. Since both Title VII and its
legislative history are silent concerning the purpose of the ban," 6 one must
consult other sources to ascertain the Title's legislative purpose. News
accounts suggest that the language of Title VII resulted from a last-minute
compromise between liberal and conservative factions in the Senate."' 7 Con-
servative proponents of the secular humanism ban maintained that the ban's
J., concurring) (public schools should be agencies of cohesion but religious education in schools
promotes divisiveness); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(local school board's policy of providing transportation funds to public and Catholic school
students is unconstitutional because purpose of first amendment was to exclude religious
controversy from public life). In Mueller v. Allen, however, the majority opinion stated that
courts should limit the political divisiveness question to cases involving government subsidies
paid directly to parochial schools or teachers. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.l 1 (1983).
113. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985); Crowley v.
Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980): Jackson v. State of California, 460 F.2d 282
(9th Cir. 1972). In these cases the plaintiffs objected to the influence of the "religion" of
secular humanism in public schools or institutions. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534; Crowley, 636
F.2d at 740; Jackson, 460 F.2d at 283 n.1. In each case the courts rejected the plaintiffs' claims
without deciding whether secular humanism is a religion. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534 ("secular
humanism may be a religion" but use of book in classroom did not constitute establishment of
any religion); Crowley, 636 F.2d at 742 (Smithsonian's exhibit on evolution does not establish
religion simply because secular humanists advocate evolution); Jackson, 460 F.2d at 283 n. I
(no evidence that public school system is hostile toward religion or has established "irreligion
of secular humanism"). See supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text (discussion of secular
humanism as religion).
114. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussion of claim that humanistic
education is equivalent to secular humanism in public schools).
115. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (three-part test for analysis of
Establishment Clause issues); supra notes 85-112 and accompanying text (discussion of appli-
cation of Lemon test).
116. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (purpose of secular humanism ban is
not evident in Title VII or legislative history).
117. See Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at A16; Department Proposes Rule, supra note 34,
at A19, col. 5. Senator Moynihan and Senator Eagleton delayed passage of the math and
science bill in order to add the magnet school amendment to provide aid for school districts
trying to implement court-ordered desegregation efforts. Washington Post, supra, at A19, col.
5; N.Y. Times, supra, at A16, col. 5. Moynihan and Eagleton sought the support of Senator
Hatch who, according to one of his aides, proposed a list of prohibitions designed "to focus
the money on real concrete academic subjects ... and to get away from the softer social
engineering kinds of things." Washington Post, supra, at A19, col. 5. After Senator Baker
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purpose is to ensure that schools use magnet school funds only for academic
and vocational programs."' If the drafters of the ban were simply advocating
curriculum improvement, the drafters might have used plainer language to
convey this purpose instead of using "secular humanism," an undefined
term." 9 The use of such an ambiguous term in Title VII suggests that the
drafters intended to provide local school boards with a license to censor
ideas that boards find objectionable.2 0 The Establishment Clause prevents a
school board from censoring ideas based solely on religious objections to
those ideas.'2 ' By allowing a school board to determine that those objection-
able ideas fall under the rubric of secular humanism, Title VII provides a
secular purpose for censorship. Since objections to secular humanism fre-
quently have a religious basis,1'2 the purpose of legislation forbidding instruc-
tion of secular humanist courses arguably is to endorse the dominant religion
in a community and to enable school boards to eliminate competing ideas
or views by branding those ideas as secular humanism. Unless the secular
humanism ban also has a clearly secular purpose, the ban violates the
Establishment Clause.'
23
Even if a secular purpose exists behind the secular humanism ban, the
ban may fail to satisfy the second prong of the Lemon test.' 24 If the ban
serves to remove all humanistic courses and ideas from magnet school
curricula, then the primary effect of the ban will be to place the government's
"virtually ordered" the opposing senators to compromise, a few senators from each side met
and eliminated all of Hatch's prohibitions except those that proscribe using magnet school
grants for "consultants, for transportation, or for any activity which does not augment academic
improvement, or for courses of instruction the substance of which is secular humanism." See
N.Y. Times, supra, at A16, Col. 5-6; 20 U.S.C. § 4059 (1985) (EESA). On the same day as the
senatorial compromise, the Senate approved the magnet school amendment. 130 CONG. REc.
56682 (daily ed. June 6, 1984). Later Senator Moynihan-stated, "I thought it was the price I
had to pay to get school desegregation money." N.Y. Times, supra, at A16, col. 6.
118. Department Proposes Rule, supra note 34, at A19, col. 5.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 19-40 (discussing vagueness of definitions of
secular humanism). If proponents of the secular humanism ban actually wanted to ensure that
school systems would use magnet school funds to teach only concrete academic subjects and
vocational programs, those legislators could have drafted a bill specifically Itmiting use of those
funds for courses in physical, social and computer sciences, history, math, English, foreign
languages, and vocational education. This language would define the act's purpose more clearly.
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (purpose of secular humanism ban is to
support fundamentalist values).
121. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (held, Arkansas law prohibiting
teaching of evolution theory violated Establishment Clause because law's sole purpose was to
blot out theory that conflicted with literal interpretation of Bible); see also Board of Educ.,
Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (state may not deny access to idea for partisan or political reasons because pluralism
of ideas is fundamental to American system of government).
122. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing religious objections to secular
humanism).
123. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing secular purpose requirement).
124. See Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (second prong of Lemon test
examines statute to determine whether statute's primary effect advances or inhibits religion).
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stamp of disapproval on secular humanist ideas and values and thus place
the government's sanction on the ideas and values of the opponents of
secular humanism. Through its wholesale rejection of secular humanism, the
government violates the Establishment Clause, which requires the government
to take a neutral stance toward religious differences.' 2 Furthermore, the
secular humanism ban may promote political divisiveness along religious
lines as fundamentalist groups struggle with opponents to gain influence over
local school boards responsible for defining secular humanism. 1 6
Suppose, for example, that a school board defines the theory of evolution
as secular humanism and then proceeds to remove evolution from the
curriculum of magnet schools. The board's action could survive a first
amendment challenge with the defense that the secular humanism ban in
Title VII provides a secular purpose for excluding evolution from magnet
schools. 127 Since the stated purpose of the EESA was to improve the quality
of scientific education, 28 it is ironic that the EESA could make possible the
omission of a theory considered to be the "cornerstone of modern biol-
ogy." 29 Because the purpose and language of the secular humanism ban are
vague, the ban has potentially disastrous consequences which are incompat-
ible with the thrust of the EESA. 30
125. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (first amendment requires state
neutrality toward believers and nonbelievers); supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of neutrality requirement).
126. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (discussion of excessive entanglement).
127. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (Supreme Court struck down
Arkansas anti-evolution law because law had only religious purpose); supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text (same).
128. See 20 U.S.C. § 3901 (1985) (EESA) (purpose of EESA is to improve quality of
mathematics and science instruction).
129. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
("evolution is cornerstone of modern biology"). In striking down an Arkansas statute that
required public schools to teach both "creation-science" and "evolution-science," the McLean
court found that the theory of evolution is incorporated as a major theme in virtually all major
textbooks and that "creation-science" is not a science. Id. at 1259, 1267.
130. The hypothetical example in the text assumes that a magnet school which did not
teach evolution could attract enough minority students to achieve desegregation goals. See 20
U.S.C. § 4052 (1985) (EESA). To be eligible for magnet school funding under Title VII of the
EESA, a school must have experienced a $1 million reduction in funding immediately following
the repeal of the Emergency School Assistance Act in 1981, or must be implementing a court-
ordered desegregation plan or a voluntary desegregation plan which the Secretary of Education
has approved under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
The example also assumes that a student or parent would have standing to challenge the
school board's action. See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984) (to have standing
plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to defendant's unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by requested relief). Since attendance at magnet schools is voluntary, a student
might have difficulty demonstrating that the curriculum of a magnet school caused a personal
injury. In Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court recognized as an injury a child's diminished
ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school. Id. at 3328. In some school
districts, magnet schools might be the only substantially integrated schools. In the hypothetical
magnet school, which defined evolution as secular humanism and consequently did not teach
evolution, the quality of science education would be arguably inferior. See McLean v. Arkansas
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While Title VII's secular humanism ban entails constitutional questions
centering on the Establishment Clause, Title VIII involves free exercise and
free speech.' 3 ' The Supreme Court has recognized a tension or potential
conflict between the Establishment Clause's prohibition against government
establishment of religion and the Free Exercise Clause's emphasis on individ-
ual freedom of expression.'3 2 The Free Exercise Clause forbids government
action that restricts or interferes with religious practice unless the government
can demonstrate that its action is necessary to further a compelling state
interest.'33 For example, in Yoder v. Wisconsin3 4 the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment required the state to accommodate the religious
beliefs and practices of the Amish, who believe that their children should
not attend public school after completing the eighth grade. 3 5 The Yoder
Court rejected the State's contention that the state interest served by com-
pulsory school attendance laws was sufficiently compelling to override the
religious practices of the Amish.
3 6
One legal commentator has suggested that the Free Exercise Clause
creates a "zone of permissible accommodation."' 3 7 The Supreme Court has
agreed that government action may accommodate religion without going so
far as to establish religion.' 38 The Court has approved state accommodations
Board of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (student deprived of access to
prevailing scientific theory will be educationally deprived). In this situation a sttident-plaintiff
might contend that the school board's action eliminating evolution from the curriculum of
magnet schools denies the student the opportunity to attend a racially integrated school without
sacrificing the quality of scientific education.
131. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title VIII).
132. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2504 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that two religion clauses would clash if carried to extreme); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (tension between free exercise and establishment clauses is
inevitable); WaIz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (because religion clauses are stated
in absolute terms, clauses would clash if expanded to logical extremes).
133. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (ruling state's interest was not
sufficiently compelling to force Amish religious practice to conform to state's compulsory
school attendance law).
134. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
135. Id. at 235.
136. See id. at 224-25. The Yoder Court held that the State had not shown that Amish
youngsters required an additional one or two years of public school education to enable them
to participate effectively and intelligently in the political system or to enable them to become
self-sufficient members of society. Id.
137. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CowsTrrurnoNAL LAw 823 (1978).
138. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). In Zorach, Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority stated: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.... We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary." Id. The Zorach Court held that the Constitution permitted schools to
accommodate people's spiritual needs through "released time" programs. Id. at 309. The
Zorach Court added that the Constitution does not require government to show "callous
indifference" to religious groups. Id. at 314. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing released time programs).
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of religion such as released time program in schools '3 9 and tax exemption
for religious institutions," 0 while ruling that the first amendment does not
require the states to assist parents in providing religious education to their
children. 
4 1
The stated purpose of the original Senate equal access bill was to confirm
and to clarify the rights of students to exercise religious freedom through
voluntary extracurricular meetings at school." 2 Title VIII, the Equal Access
Act, broadened the scope of the original bill to include the religious, political,
and philosophical content of speech at meetings of student groups."43 Based
on the language and legislative history'44 of the Act, the purpose of the Act
is to ensure that secondary schools receiving federal financial assistance, and
having a limited open forum as defined in the Act,"4 5 do not deny students
access to that forum based on the content of the students' speech. The
phrase "limited open forum" refers to a school policy of allowing
"noncurriculum-related" student groups to meet on school premises.'4 Title
VIII encourages schools to recognize that students have the right to engage
in free speech and to conduct meetings as long as those meetings are
voluntary, student-initiated, and do not disrupt educational activities."
47
The legislative history of Title VIII suggests that the impetus for equal
access legislation was a congressional perception of a need for legislation to
end legal confusion and litigation concerning the relationship between schools
and student religious groups."4 8 Title VIII addresses the authority of school
139. 343 U.S. at 315. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussion of released
time programs).
140. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). See also notes 42, 46 (discussion
of tax exemption of religious institutions).
141. See Brusca v. Missouri ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971)
(religion clauses do not require state to provide financial aid to help parents educate children
religiously), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972).
142. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2348, 2349; infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Title
VIII).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1985) (EESA). See supra note 15 (discussing differences between
original bill and Equal Access Act).
144. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, (report of Senate Judiciary Committee
on original equal access bill), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2348.
145. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1985) (EESA). Under the Equal Access Act, a public
secondary school has a limited open forum whenever that school allows or offers to allow one
or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet at the school during noninstructional
time. Id. Noninstructional time occurs before or after actual classroom instruction. 20 U.S.C.
§ 4072(4). See infra note 175 (definition of noninstructional time).
146. See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text (discussing undefined terms in Title
VIII).
147. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1985) (EESA).
148. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 14-17, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2348, 2358, 2360-63. Misunderstanding of legal issues and fear of expensive lawsuits
have led some school administrators to drastically restrict students' rights. Id. at 2358, 2360.
Testimony presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that some schools have banned
religious clubs and religiously affiliated community service organizations from meeting on
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administrators to exercise discretionary control over student activities outside
the classroom. 49 Support exists for the view that school authorities should
not exercise the same degree of control over extracurricular activities as over
curriculum related activities.5 0 In Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, "I for example, the Supreme Court dealt
with the question whether the first amendment limits a school board's
discretion to remove books from a school library.s 2 The Pico plurality held
that a school board has less discretion to determine the contents of a school
library than to select classroom curriculum.'53 The plurality stated that while
campus and that some school officials have prohibited even private religious discussions among
students. Id. at 2361-63.
A few senators expressed special concern about the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lubbock
Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District. Id. at 2366; see Lubbock, 669
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983). Senator Strom Thurmond
interpreted the Lubbock decision as requiring an affirmative hostility toward religious values.
S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2345,
2366. In an amicus curiae brief in support of the Lubbock School District's petition for writ of
certiorari, twenty-four senators declared that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lubbock required
the state to become the adversary of students desiring to engage in religious activities. Id.
The Lubbock court held that a school board policy that authorized meetings of student
groups for religious purposes before and after school constituted an establishment of religion.
Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1038. The Fifth Circuit determined that the purpose of the school
district's policy was to allow meetings of religious groups, and not to develop student leadership
and communication skills as the school district claimed. Id. at 1045. The Lubbojck court also
found that the school district's policy had the primary effect of advancing religion because
impressionable secondary and primary age school children might interpret the policy as placing
the district's approval on religious activity. Id. Furthermore, the court ruled that the use of
school facilities by religious groups and supervision of religious meetings by school personnel
created excessive entanglement. Id. at 1047. See supra notes 87-112 and accompanying text
(discussing use of Lemon test for Establishment Clause analysis).
While the Lubbock opinion appears to approach requiring government hostility toward
religion, the decision may be an anomaly based on the peculiar facts of that case. S. REP. No.
357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2348, 2353. The
Lubbock School District had a long history of unconstitutional policies, such as permitting
school-sponsored prayer, Bible readings, and evangelistic speakers and the distribution of
Gideon Bibles to students. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1040 n.3. The school district continued to
allow many of these practices for almost ten years after assuring the Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union that the District would stop those practices. Id. at 1039.
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1985) (EESA) (Title VIII applies to student groups desiring to
meet on school premises during noninstructional time); supra notes 13, 14, 142-148 and infra
notes 179-184 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Title VIII).
150. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982) (plurality opinion) (first amendment restricts school board's discretion to remove
books from school library because use of library is extracurricular activity); Bowman v. Bethel-
Tate Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (first amendment restricts school board's
discretion to stop production of extracurricular student play); infra notes 157-59 and accom-
panying text (discussing Bowman).
151. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
152. Id. at 863.
153. Id. at 869. The Pico Court's majority holding was limited to a procedural question
on summary judgment. Id. at 862-63. The Pico Court held that summary judgment was not
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a school board may claim discretion over curriculum based on the board's
duty to inculcate community values, that degree of discretion does not extend
beyond the classroom.'14 The Pico plurality recognized that a right to receive
ideas exists which is implied by the first amendment and which restricts the
school board's authority to deny access to ideas outside the classroom for
political or partisan reasons. ' The Pico Court characterized the use of a school
library as an extracurricular activity because students use the library on a volun-
tary basis. 56
Relying on Pico, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held, in Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education, that
a school board could not stop the production of a voluntary extracurricular
play solely because the board disagreed with some of the ideas expressed in
the play. ' 7 In Bowman, the district court distinguished between the board's
"exceptional amount of discretion" over curriculum and the board's obli-
gation to respect the first amendment rights of students and teachers engaged
in voluntary extracurricular activity.5 8 The Bowman court found that the
play was an extracurricular activity since participation was completely vol-
untary and rehearsals were held before and after school. 5 9 Both Pico and
Bowman support the proposition that school authorities have less discretion
to restrict students' rights during extracurricular activities than during cur-
ricular activities. '6
appropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the basis of the school
board's decision to remove the books from the library. Id. at 875. The plurality in Pico.
expressed the opinion that if the board's intent to deny access to ideas was the decisive factor
in the board's decision, then the board exercised discretion in violation of the first amendment.
Id. at 871.
154. Id. at 869.
155. Id. at 867. In Pico, the plurality maintained that the first amendment's free speech
guarantee implies a right to receive ideas because access to ideas and information is necessary
for the meaningful exercise of the rights of speech, press, and political freedom. Id. at 867.
Four dissenters, however, contended that an individual's right to receive ideas does not require
the government to provide those ideas. Id. at 886.
156. Id. at 869 (school library gives students opportunity for voluntary enrichment, self-
education, and free inquiry).
157. See Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 577, 582 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
In Bowman, the District Court enjoined the school board from interfering with the production
of a play by third graders. Id. at 582. The board objected to the play, a musical comedy entitled
Sorceror and Friends, because in the board's opinion the play "glorifies cowardice, denigrates
patriotism, and disparages the aged." Id. at 581.
158. Id. at 581-82.
159. Id. at 579-80.
160. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The
Tinker Court noted that even during regular school hours, the first amendment limits the
discretion of school authorities. Id. at 507. In upholding the right of students to wear black
armbands at school to demonstrate opposition to the Viet Nam War, the Tinker Court held
that a school may not prohibit the expression of a particular viewpoint unless the prohibition
is "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline." Id.
at 511.
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Whether the Free Exercise Clause requires, or even permits, schools to
allow meetings of student religious groups depends on whether these meetings
create the impression that the school is placing its imprimatur on a particular
religion. In Brandon v. Board of Education,'6' the Second Circuit upheld
the right of a school board to deny the request of a student group to conduct
prayer meetings in a classroom immediately prior to the beginning of
classes.'62 The Brandon court held that because the school had an obligation
to supervise students during that time, allowing a prayer group would create
the appearance of official approval of a religious activity. 63 In Brandon, the
Second Circuit refused to require a school board to accommodate a religious
group because of the school board's compelling interest in avoiding the
appearance of state endorsement of a particular belief.' 64 In Lubbock Civil
Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District,165 however, the
Fifth Circuit appeared to go further in restricting students' rights. The
Lubbock court held that the school board's policy of allowing meetings of
student religious groups before and after school on the same basis as other
student groups was an impermissible accommodation of religion because the
policy created the impression of official school board approval.'66
A school's open forum policy may weaken the school's interest in
avoiding the appearance of official approval of a religious group. In Widmar
v. Vincent 67 the Supreme Court held that a state university having an open
forum policy, which generally allowed on-campus meetings of student groups,
could not exclude student religious groups based on the content of those
groups' speech. 6 The Widmar Court concluded that the university's action
violated the fundamental principle that state regulation of speech be "con-
tent-neutral.' ' 69 The Court reasoned that once a university has created a
forum generally open to students by accommodating many student groups,
the university must justify discriminating against some student groups tnder
the constitutional norms applicable to prior restraint. 70 These norms require
that the government policy be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. 7,
The Widmar Court held that in the context of an open forum, the state's
161. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
162. Id. at 973.
163. Id. at 978-79.
164. Id. at 978.
165. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
166. See id. at 1045; supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing Lubbock).
167. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
168. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). In Widmar, the University of
Missouri at Kansas City, which had allowed an evangelical student group to use university
facilities for four years, rescinded permission for the group to hold meetings on campus,
maintaining that the United States Constitution and state law required separation of church
and state. Id. at 265, 270. The Widmar Court construed the issue as whether the university
could exclude a religious group from an open forum. Id. at 273.
169. Id. at 277.
170. Id. at 269-70.
171. Id. at 270.
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 43:265
interest in avoiding the appearance of official endorsement of religion is not
sufficiently compelling to justify excluding religious groups from that forum. 7 2
Asserting that the primary effect of an open forum does not advance religion,
the Widmar Court explained that an equal access policy confers only
incidential benefits on religious groups.'
73
The Equal Access Act attempts to extend the Widmar holding to
secondary schools. In Widmar, however, the Supreme Court noted that
college students are less impressionable than younger students and can
appreciate the policy of neutrality toward religion. 7 4 Whether secondary
school students are mature enough to appreciate and understand the neu-
trality policy is a matter of controversy.7 5 The Second Circuit in Brandon
indicated that high school students are too impressionable to distinguish
between endorsement and neutrality. 7 6 On the other hand, in considering
the need for an equal access law, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected
172. Id. at 276.
173. Id. at 274. The Widmar Court explained that the religious benefits of an open forum
are only incidental because the forum is available to a broad class of religious and nonreligious
groups. Id. at 274.
174. Id. at 274 n.14.
175. The United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide whether to extend
its holding in Widmar to younger students when the Court heard the case of Bender v. Williamsport
Area School District in October, 1985. See 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1985). In Bender the Third Circuit
upheld a school district's decision to deny access to a student religious group, observing that
high school students probably could not distinguish between accommodation and endorsement
of religious activity. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 552 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Third Circuit rendered a decision In Bender a few weeks before the President signed the
Equal Access Act. Remes, EqualAccess Act, 'Humanism Ban Extend an Invitation to Litigation,
Nat'l L.J., June 24, 1985, at 16, col. 2. The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari
filed by the Bender students who were joined by the United States. Id. The Supreme Court,
however, never reached the merits of the case because the Court vacated the judgment of the
Third Circuit on grounds that the appellant, a member of the school board, lacked standing
to appeal as an individual. 106 S. Ct. at 1335.
Amicus briefs in the Bender litigation at the Supreme Court level invoked Title VIII to sup-
port the students' position because the Equal Access Act applies to secondary schools. Nat'l L.J.,
supra, at 16, col. 2. The plaintiffs in Bender and the United States contended that in enacting
Title VIII Congress found as a matter of fact that secondary school students are capable of
distinguishing between school accomodation of religion and school endorsement of religion. Id.
See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1985) (EESA) (Title VIII mandates equal access for student groups in
public secondary schools having a limited open forum). Application of the Act may not be ap-
propriate, however, because the Bender student group requested to meet during a scheduled ac-
tivity period during school hours. See Bender, 741 F.2d at 543. The Act, however, restricts the
equal access requirement to meetings held during noninstructional time. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b)
(1985) (EESA). The Act defines noninstructional time as "time set aside by the school before
actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." Id. at § 4072(4).
The legislative history of Title VIII indicates that Congress intended "noninstructional" time
to mean before or after regular school hours. See 130 CoNo. REC. S8353 (daily ed. June 27,
1984) (statement of Senator Hatfield).
176. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1123 (1981). The Brandon court reasoned that impressionable high school students might
view the appearance of school involvement in religious activity as an indication of state
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the position that younger students would not be able to make the distinction
between school-sponsored and student-led religious activities.'"
One may read the Equal Access Act as an attempt to use the principles
expressed by the Supreme Court in Pico and Widmar to protect students
from discrimination by school authorities. 78 The Act essentially reinforces
and protects the first amendment right of all student groups to use school
facilities before or after regular school hours if the school allows that privilege
to some student groups. 79 The Act recognizes, however, that schools must
have authority to maintain safety and discipline and to ensure that student
participation is voluntary.'10 One purpose of the Act is to assure school
officials that accommodating different student groups does not constitute
endorsement of those groups or their philosophies.'
While the spirit of toleration in Title VIII may serve to promote the
values of pluralism, the Act's vague terminology creates problems for
application. The Act states that a limited open forum exists when a school
allows meetings of "noncurriculum related" student groups.8 2 Since the Act
fails to define the term noncurriculum related, the meaning of "limited open
forum" is unclear. The original equal access bill used the term extracurri-
cular, ' 3 but the drafters of Title VIII apparently rejected that term in favor
of "noncurriculum related," which connotes a narrower meaning than
"extracurricular." High school students engage in a wide variety of extra-
curricular group activities, many of which are related to some element of
the school curriculum. Examples of curriculum related, extracurricular stu-
dent groups that use school facilities include foreign language, science, and
endorsement. Id. The Second Circuit held that the school board had a compelling interest in
avoiding a symbolic inference of state endorsement of a particular religious creed. Id.
177. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2348, 2355. The Senate Committee Report on the equal access bill rejected the notion
that students "below college level" could not distinguish between religious speech that is school-
sponsored and teacher-led and religious speech that is initiated and led by students as one of a
variety of extra-curricular activities. Id. The report also stated that students may perceive state
hostility toward religion if all religious speech in extracurricular activities is banned. Id.
178. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (discussing Pico); notes 168-74 and
accompanying text (discussing Widmar).
179. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1985) (EESA). See supra notes 13, 14, 149-153 and accompanying
text (discussing provisions of Title VIII).
180. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f) (1985) (EESA) (Title VIII does not limit school's authority
to maintain order, to protect students and teachers, and to assure that students' attendance at
meetings is voluntary).
181. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (purpose of Equal Access Act was to allay
fears of school officials who believed that accommodation of student religious groups violated
Constitution). The Act's assurance that religious accommodation does not constitute endorse-
ment implies that Congress assumed that secondary school students are able to distinguish
between endorsement and accommodation. See supra note 175 (contention of plaintiffs in
Bender).
182. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1985) (EESA).
183. See S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-38, (section by section analysis of
original equal access bill in report of Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2348, 2382-84.
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computer clubs, thespian societies, and vocation-related groups. The term
noncurriculum related may apply only to those student groups that have
absolutely no connection to courses offered in the curriculum.1' The uncer-
tain meaning of "noncurriculum related" student groups creates the danger
that the Equal Access Act will not apply to schools that limit the use of
school facilities to groups having some tenuous relationship to the curricu-
lum. Thus, for example, a school administrator could claim that his school
does not provide a limited open forum within the meaning of Title VIII
because the school only allows meetings of curriculum related student groups.
The Equal Access Act may fail to achieve its goal of stemming the tide
of litigation in this area because of the undefined term "noncurriculum
related" and limited application of the Act. The language of the Act restricts
the Act's protection of student rights to those schools that provide a limited
open forum.'85 In addition, by not clearly defining terms, the Act appears
to grant considerable leeway to school administrators to decide whether their
school policies concerning extracurricular activities come within the meaning
of the Act. For the most part, school board members and school adminis-
trators are not legal experts familiar with legal terms and concepts such as
zones of permissible accommodation.'1 6 School officials will probably con-
tinue to make decisions based on a limited appreciation of complex consti-
tutional questions, a fear of expensive lawsuits, and a desire to avoid
controversy. 187
Title VIII's ambition to promote pluralism and free expression seems
incompatible with Title VII's secular humanism ban, which appears to
promote censorship.' 8 Both acts represent congressional attempts to address
aspects of the ideological conflict between secularists and fundamentalists
concerning the role of religion in public education. 8 9 Both acts are also
illustrations of the type of ineffective lawmaking that frequently results from
184. See 130 CONG. REc. 58342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Senator Hatfield).
During the Senate debate on the Equal Access Amendment, Senator Hatfield explained that
student groups such as the French Club or Spanish Club are connected to the school curriculum,
but other groups such as the Young Republicans or the Chess Club are noncurriculum related
groups. Id. Senator Hatfield also stated that the Act ultimately allows each school board to
decide where to draw the line between curriculum related and noncurriculum related groups.
Id.
185. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (EESA) (unlawful for school with limited open forum to deny
equal access).
186. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text (discussing zones of permissible
accommodation).
187. See supra note 148 (discussing reactions of school administrators to legal confusion
and fear of lawsuits).
188. See supra notes 142-47, 174-81 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title
VIII); notes 15-16, 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's censorship).
189. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1123 (1981). The Brandon Court remarked: "In this immigrant nation of dreamers and
dissidents, however, no broad consensus regarding the spiritual side of the human condition
exists." Id.
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political compromise. Unfortunately, this legislation, weakened by the use
of undefined terms, will probably not succeed in removing the public school
system from the battleground of religious differences.1 9°
Lucy B. MULLNs
190. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948). In his concurrence,
Justice Jackson stated:
If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these warring sects
or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds.
Nothing but educational confusion and a discrediting of the public school system can
result from subjecting it to constant law suits.
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